The Taliban’s campaign against Afghanistan’s independent media has intensified, with at least three outlets — Rah-e Farda TV, Tamadon TV and Radio Sedaye Eslah — facing shutdowns, office closures or suspended broadcasts. The measures have raised concerns about the future of independent journalism and the space for Shiite and Hazara voices in the country.
As reported by IRAF, the Taliban’s restrictions on Afghanistan’s media have escalated from regulatory pressure to forced shutdowns, asset seizures and the cancellation of broadcasting licences, according to media outlets and rights groups. The latest measures have targeted Rah-e Farda TV and Radio Sedaye Eslah, following the suspension of Tamadon TV earlier this year.
The developments have prompted concerns among media freedom advocates, who say the Taliban are using legal, security and political measures to tighten control over public discourse and restrict independent voices.
Radio Sedaye Eslah said its broadcasts had been suspended and its office sealed by a delegation from the Taliban’s Ministry of Justice after nearly 18 years of operation. The radio said the ministry had raised concerns about its licence and name, and that its activities would remain suspended until those issues were resolved.
The case of Rah-e Farda is more complicated. The broadcaster, which has a significant audience among Afghanistan’s Shiite and Hazara communities, had already been suspended earlier this year. In February, the Taliban halted its operations and cancelled the licence of its former owner, Mohammad Mohaqiq. In June, the station resumed broadcasting under new ownership and with a new licence. Its office has now been closed again, with reports that its assets were seized.
The Committee to Protect Journalists said the renewed shutdown of Rah-e Farda and the detention of its new owner, Salman Akhlaqi, showed that the Taliban were seeking to eliminate what remained of Afghanistan’s independent media. The group also expressed concern about growing pressure on outlets whose primary audiences are Shiite and Hazara Afghans.
From legal cases to political pressure
The Taliban have cited various reasons for their actions against media outlets, including licensing and ownership disputes, alleged violations of media regulations, financial issues and political affiliations. But critics say the timing of some measures and the history of the outlets suggest that the issue is not always administrative.
In Rah-e Farda’s case, the first suspension in 2026 followed remarks by Mohammad Mohaqiq about clashes between the Taliban and Pakistan. A Taliban spokesman for the Ministry of Information and Culture said at the time that the outlet affiliated with Mohaqiq had been shut down and its assets seized.
The episode illustrates how the Taliban may blur the distinction between a media organization and its owner or manager. An outlet whose owner has a political background can be treated as an extension of a political movement, even when it operates within professional media standards.
The same question has arisen over Tamadon TV, one of Afghanistan’s longest-running broadcasters and a prominent Shiite media outlet. The Taliban cited legal and ownership issues involving institutions associated with the network when explaining its suspension. The move came amid pressure on the Khatam al-Nabieen educational and religious complex.
The closure of Tamadon cannot be viewed separately from the Taliban’s broader approach to social, religious, educational and cultural institutions. In that case, the broadcaster was one part of a wider complex whose activities the Taliban had scrutinised. Tamadon TV, Khatam al-Nabieen University and the seminary were all closed or suspended within a short period, according to the report.
The report also says the Taliban seized and closed Tamadon’s office without following a judicial process.
Why media matters to the Taliban
Media remains one of the most important tools for shaping public opinion. In Afghanistan, television and radio continue to play a significant role in providing information, particularly in areas where internet access is limited.
For a government seeking to control public discourse, regulating these outlets is therefore a key priority. Experts cited in the report say the Taliban’s treatment of Shiite-owned media has been particularly severe, raising concerns about religious and ethnic discrimination.
Since returning to power in August 2021, the Taliban have sought to keep private media operating within a new framework of regulations and red lines rather than eliminate it altogether. Outlets have faced content restrictions, limits on interviews with opponents, pressure on journalists and rules governing television images and programming.
Under these conditions, the closure of a media outlet sends a message to others: crossing the Taliban’s red lines can lead to suspension, licence cancellation, detention of staff or the seizure of equipment.
Many outlets have consequently resorted to self-censorship. Even those that remain open may have lost part of their professional function, or may seek to align their content with the Taliban’s objectives. Yet the cases described in the report suggest that such alignment is not always enough, raising questions about whether the authorities’ concern extends beyond the content of media coverage to the presence of certain outlets themselves.
Shiite and Hazara communities: a sensitive point
The closures of Rah-e Farda and Tamadon are particularly significant because both outlets have held an important place among Afghanistan’s Shiite and Hazara communities. Both were shut down or restricted within a short period, with their officials detained, according to the report.
Rah-e Farda began operating in 2007 and developed a broad audience among Hazaras and Shiites. Its renewed suspension this year has been viewed by media freedom advocates as part of wider pressure on outlets owned by or associated with Shiite communities.
The simultaneous suspension of Tamadon and restrictions on the Khatam al-Nabieen complex further heightened concerns. Afghanistan’s Shiite Ulema Council had previously called for the resumption of Tamadon’s broadcasts and an end to restrictions on Shiite religious and educational institutions. Tamadon is known for producing and broadcasting Islamic and religious content.
The issue, therefore, extends beyond press freedom to social representation. When media outlets serving a particular community are closed or restricted, that community’s ability to express demands, report events and participate in public life is also reduced.
Radio Sedaye Eslah: a different case
The suspension of Radio Sedaye Eslah shows that pressure on media is not limited to Shiite or politically affiliated outlets.
The radio had operated in Afghanistan for nearly 18 years. In the latest action, the Taliban suspended its activities over concerns related to its licence and name.
The case suggests that even outlets with long histories of operation remain dependent on the approval and acceptance of the Taliban’s regulatory structures.
Afghanistan and the closure of media outlets
The closures of Rah-e Farda, Tamadon and Sedaye Eslah come as Afghanistan’s media sector has faced a severe crisis over the past five years. Economic difficulties, declining advertising revenue, the migration of journalists, security restrictions and political pressure have forced many outlets to close or reduce their operations.
Journalists have also continued to face security risks. The report says independent and media-affiliated journalists have repeatedly been detained and imprisoned without clear charges during the Taliban’s rule, prompting many to change careers or leave the country.
The decline in the number of active outlets and independent journalists means fewer local sources of information for Afghans. Each closure removes part of the country’s information network and increases reliance on official sources or media based outside Afghanistan.
The central issue: control of the narrative
Taken together, the recent cases point to a broader pattern: the Taliban are seeking to define Afghanistan’s media space within a framework in which outlets must align with government policies, avoid sensitive political criticism and comply with the authorities’ rules on social and religious issues.
The restrictions on Tamadon, Rah-e Farda and Sedaye Eslah suggest that the issue goes beyond a few administrative cases. Licensing, ownership and political affiliation concerns, combined with content and security pressures, have become tools for controlling the media environment.
The central question is whether the Taliban’s objective is simply to regulate media content or to create a uniform narrative of Afghanistan’s political, social and cultural life — one in which dissenting voices have little or no room to operate.
