Tehran- IRAF- Aref Rahmani wrote in a post on the social media platform X: “The war that began on February 28, 2026, with a massive attack by the United States and Israel against Iran, is not merely a conventional military confrontation; rather, a part of it was focused on a strategic objective: striking Iran’s command center and creating a power vacuum at the pinnacle of the country’s political and military structure.”
He believes that the martyrdom of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei and several senior Iranian commanders in the opening hours of the war can be analyzed within this framework; an act aimed at creating political shock, disrupting the decision-making process, and undermining coordination among Iran’s military, security, and administrative institutions.
However, according to this former Afghan parliamentarian, the course of events demonstrated that the power structure in the Islamic Republic was significantly prepared for such a scenario. The swift selection of Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei as leader largely neutralized attempts to create a power vacuum at the top of the command chain. It proved that the elimination of one person does not result in an immediate breakdown of the decision-making apparatus. As the war persists and both sides remain at a strategic impasse, the primary function of this transition has been preserving cohesion within the political and military leadership.
From Rahmani’s perspective, in the experience of many wars, stability at the top of the power structure is a key factor in maintaining crisis management efficiency. If the command center falls into confusion or internal rivalry at a time when the country is under external attack, even significant military capability may lose its effectiveness. From this standpoint, the rapid appointment of a new leader is not just a political decision, but an action to preserve operational cohesion in war management and prevent disruptions in the coordination between military, intelligence, and executive branches.
He further emphasized that selecting an individual who has been close to the decision-making center for years and is familiar with governance mechanisms, power networks, and Iran’s security and defense structures, helps maintain the continuity of the country’s grand strategies amidst the war. In such conditions, a sudden shift in defense or security policies could lead to instability in the command apparatus. Thus, the transition of leadership to someone emerged from within the same decision-making system increases the possibility of upholding major policies and maintaining strategic stability.
Aref Rahmani also noted that this leadership transition carries an important political and psychological message domestically and internationally. Domestically, the rapid appointment prevents the formation of a sense of instability at the summit of the establishment, proving that the political structure possesses the capacity for rapid leadership reproduction and continued administration of the country. Externally, it sends the message that the assassination of leaders does not necessarily lead to the collapse of the governance structure or the paralysis of the country’s defensive capability.
Simultaneously, in the view of this Afghan political activist, this selection will face long-term challenges. The most critical issue raised in some analyses is the potential perception regarding the “hereditary nature of power,” which could impact political legitimacy. While maintaining stability and preventing a power vacuum is the primary priority in wartime, how these perceptions are managed and how public trust is strengthened in the post-war period will be of decisive importance.
Aref Rahmani concluded: “In summary, if we consider the current war a strategic impasse between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other, the rapid leadership transition should be assessed as part of Iran’s effort to maintain stability in the command center and prevent the realization of the enemy’s primary objective: the collapse of the decision-making structure. This action has enabled the continued management of the war, the preservation of cohesion within the power structure, and the prevention of the enemy’s initial strike from turning into a structural crisis within Iran.”
It is worth noting that the Assembly of Experts, in its session on March 8, 2026, with a majority of votes and in accordance with the supreme interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran, elected Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei as the third leader of the Islamic Revolution.
