Dr. Hirad Mokhayeri, an international relations expert and university professor, writes exclusively for IRAF:
Pakistan, which has supported the Taliban for years and maintained its closest strategic ties with the group, has now emerged as one of the obstacles to its participation in a multilateral institution. This shift should be viewed against the backdrop of escalating attacks by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) from Afghan territory into Pakistan. Islamabad, which has paid a heavy security price for these attacks, is no longer prepared to facilitate the Taliban’s entry into international institutions without tangible security guarantees.
Alexander Wendt, a prominent international relations theorist, argues in his seminal work Social Theory of International Politics that the international legitimacy of an actor stems from its social acceptance by other actors in the international system, rather than from military or economic power alone. This concept is particularly evident today in the dynamics of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The Taliban, which has held power in Kabul for five years, has yet to secure such social acceptance among the organization’s members. It is this legitimacy gap that has left Afghanistan’s seat empty at one of Eurasia’s most important security and economic gatherings.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, scheduled to take place in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on September 1, 2025, will be held for the fifth consecutive year without a representative from Kabul. The repeated absence has once again raised serious questions about Afghanistan’s position in the region’s security and economic calculations. This analysis examines the roots of Afghanistan’s absence, the organization’s internal complexities over how to engage with Afghanistan, and the strategic implications of the situation for the Taliban and its neighbors.
To understand the situation, it is necessary to begin with a structural reality. Afghanistan has been an observer member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization since 2005, but the country’s representatives last officially attended SCO meetings in 2020, before the Taliban returned to power. Since then, Afghanistan has been left outside the summit for the fifth consecutive year. This is not a coincidence, but rather the result of an implicit consensus among members, each of whom has different reasons for keeping Kabul out. The issue that has brought the organization to an impasse over inviting the Taliban is international recognition, which has become a persistent problem among its members and remains unresolved despite extensive behind-the-scenes negotiations.
With the exception of Russia, no other SCO member has recognized the Taliban government, turning any formal invitation into a politically costly issue.
What makes the equation even more complicated is the internal divide among SCO members over the Taliban. According to remarks by Zamir Kabulov, Russia’s special presidential envoy for Afghanistan, the main obstacle to the Taliban’s participation in the organization is the explicit opposition of one member. The Russian newspaper Izvestia has identified Pakistan as the most likely country to be opposed.
This is particularly significant from an analytical perspective. Pakistan, which for years supported the Taliban and maintained the group’s closest strategic ties, has now become one of the obstacles to its participation in a multilateral institution. This shift should be analyzed in the context of escalating attacks by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan from Afghan territory into Pakistan. Having borne heavy security costs as a result of these attacks, Islamabad is no longer willing to open the way for the Taliban to enter international institutions without tangible security guarantees.
The Taliban was also absent from the organization’s consultative meeting on Afghanistan, held in Dushanbe on September 11 and 12, 2025. This additional absence further highlights the depth of Kabul’s isolation.
The economic consequences of Afghanistan’s absence are even more serious than they may initially appear. In recent years, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has evolved into a framework for coordinating transit, energy and trade projects across Eurasia, with member states benefiting from these arrangements. Afghanistan, being outside this framework, is also excluded from negotiations over transit corridors, regional energy projects and joint financing mechanisms.
The organization’s deputy secretary-general has emphasized that Afghanistan, because of its geographic position, is a natural neighbor of the member states and plays an important role on the organization’s security agenda. Yet geographic significance, unless translated into political acceptance, offers Kabul little tangible benefit in practice.
In an effort to break the deadlock, the organization has decided to merge the “observer” and “dialogue partner” statuses into a new status known as “SCO partner.” Under the new arrangement, Afghanistan and Mongolia can participate in certain activities, provided that the host country issues a formal invitation. The initiative effectively creates a dual-track arrangement: on the one hand, it allows more flexible engagement with the Taliban without granting it formal legitimacy; on the other, it gives the host country discretion to make decisions based on its own interests.
This approach reflects the dilemma facing SCO members. They cannot completely ignore the Taliban because Afghanistan lies at the heart of the region’s security concerns, yet they cannot recognize the group because the political costs of doing so remain too high.
The empty Afghan seat in Bishkek sends a clear strategic message to the Taliban. Members of the organization stressed at the summit that the formation of an inclusive government representing all ethnic and political groups in Afghanistan is the only viable path toward lasting peace and stability. The Taliban, which had hoped to use multilateral diplomacy to bridge its legitimacy gap, is discovering through its repeated absence that the road to international recognition runs through domestic reforms, rather than diplomatic maneuvering.
For neighboring countries, including Iran, the situation also carries a serious message. As long as the question of the Taliban’s legitimacy remains unresolved, engagement with Afghanistan through regional frameworks will continue amid uncertainty and ambiguity—an environment in which no regional actor can confidently plan for the long term.
