While Iran and the United States are in a ceasefire, U.S. President Donald Trump claims to have secured Chinese President Xi Jinping’s pledge to refrain from arming Iran and to cooperate in reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Currently, leaders in both Tehran and Washington see time as an ally, hoping to leverage economic pressure to weaken the opponent’s political will and expand their influence.
The reality is that Trump does not hold enough leverage to compel Iranian leaders to accept his conditions for ending the war, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and ending the U.S. maritime blockade of Iran. In contrast, Iranian leaders hold numerous cards, and more importantly, it is their strategic play with these cards — far more complex than merely possessing them — that counts. Trump likely understands this.
A key point about strategic cards is that once played, they are no longer available. From this perspective, Iranian leaders — many skilled in the chessboard of international diplomacy — carefully consider how to play their hand. Iranian officials understand that oil and gas are distinct commodities with different market dynamics. Delivering oil to various markets is relatively easier than gas, though its characteristics and specialized refineries impose certain limitations. Crucially, the global energy system cannot easily absorb a disruption in oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz.
Many have previously analyzed the potential consequences of closing the Strait of Hormuz for U.S. and global markets, especially when countermeasures such as operational refinery stocks and strategic reserve releases can no longer sustain supply gaps. Consensus points to sharp oil price increases and the scarcity of petroleum products for some current uses, impacting gasoline, diesel, aviation fuel, as well as inputs for plastics, semiconductors, and other common products.
Iranian leaders appear confident that Trump’s fear of these outcomes and potential domestic political repercussions might push him toward the agreement Tehran desires. If Iran plays this card — potentially triggering a global oil crisis imposing sufficiently high costs to force the U.S. not just to respond but to adapt — it can effectively use this leverage.
No one wants to cross the threshold that would trigger a true global oil crisis. Such a crisis would be costly for both the U.S. and the world. The key point: a long-term closure of the Strait of Hormuz remains a major and powerful card for Iran, limiting the ability of U.S. officials to extract everything they seek from Tehran. Any successful negotiation would inherently result in a compromise. Tehran has consistently stated that it will not reopen the strait until the U.S. ends its blockade. Trump has threatened to resume attacks if Iran rejects his terms.
China Won’t Bend to the U.S.
Trump’s recent visit to Beijing, where he met with Xi Jinping, captured global attention, as the relationship between these two leading powers could either exacerbate existing geopolitical tensions or offer hope for easing the current geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape.
While the world once operated in two blocks centered on the U.S. and Russia — with other countries aligning accordingly — such rigid blocs no longer exist. Instead, two powers exert near-universal influence through their decisions: Beijing and Washington. This explains the global focus on Trump’s China visit.
Analysts observing statements from both sides concluded that China displayed greater confidence and took a firmer stance. Xi made no effort to flatter his American counterpart or employ enticing rhetoric. Minutes after his speech, he labeled Taiwan a “red line,” making it clear that any U.S. interference in China’s long-term plans for the island could derail relationship-building efforts from the outset.
American media took note. The New York Times argued that this reflected a new level of confidence and authority displayed by Xi in public appearances, particularly as the U.S. increasingly engaged with Iran — a situation not easily resolved.
After two days of talks with Xi, Trump, returning from Beijing, told reporters that he received no firm commitment from Xi to pressure Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, adding: “I don’t want any favors, because when you ask for favors, you must give something in return.”
Meanwhile, Xi refrained from commenting publicly on Iran-related negotiations, though China’s Foreign Ministry criticized the conflict, calling it unnecessary and lacking justification for continuation.
Importantly, there is no clear Chinese commitment to act against Iran. This is significant, as China maintains strong economic ties with Tehran and is unlikely to fully align with Washington’s pressure strategy. Trump sought to demonstrate that China could play a constructive role in limiting tensions around Iran and protecting global energy flows. However, the situation is more complex for Beijing. China desires stability in the Persian Gulf due to its heavy energy dependence, yet does not want to appear as a U.S. pawn against Tehran. As a result, the talks delivered a general message in favor of stability, but no public commitment from China to pressure Iran in the manner Washington prefers.
The reality is that Beijing will not position itself to lose access to Iranian oil, nor will it support UN calls for coercive measures. China knows that if Trump succeeds in subduing Iran and seizing control of its oil as in Venezuela, Beijing would be highly vulnerable. China cannot rely on Gulf Cooperation Council states to resist U.S. pressure to block oil supplies to China in that scenario. The only country capable of resisting U.S. pressure in the Gulf is Iran. Therefore, for China, consenting to force against Iran would expose it to dangerous future leverage by the U.S. over its energy security.
