IRAF NEWS Agency Presents the Full Text of this Interview to its Readers:
In your view, why during the twelve‑day war were widespread accusations raised against migrants, and why did these accusations become believable to a considerable segment of the host society? And why, during the riots of the month of Dey (January, 2026), contrary to some predictions, we didn’t witness significant alignment with or participation by migrants alongside the rioters? What are the main reasons for this peaceful behavior?
At that time—that is, from several months prior to June 2025—the issue of organizing undocumented migrants and expelling undocumented foreign nationals (mainly Afghan nationals) had been raised. During that period, the media atmosphere was focused on the expulsion of Afghan migrants, and in some cases government officials themselves fueled this narrative. This created the belief that undocumented migrants should be rapidly expelled from the country. In the midst of this atmosphere, the twelve‑day war occurred.
During that period, in a very limited number of cases, some Afghan nationals participated in actions against the national security of the Islamic Republic. These cases were rare and limited. However, the publication of news about the cooperation of some Afghan nationals with the Zionist regime during the days of the war—combined with the pre‑existing negative mindset that had already been formed and was continuously reinforced in cyberspace—created an environment in which we witnessed a large volume of fabrication and false news regarding the widespread cooperation of migrants and Afghan nationals with the Zionist regime.
The distribution of untrue videos and false reports created the image and perception that thousands of Afghan nationals in Iran were cooperating with the Zionist regime, whereas in reality this trend was a “designed operation” aimed at undermining relations between the two nations of Iran and Afghanistan. The calculated dissemination of such a massive volume of fake videos and false news—which continuously injected incorrect information about Afghan nationals into the Iranian audience’s mind—cannot be considered accidental. Rather, it appears to be the exploitation of those specific social conditions in Iranian society by certain Western intelligence‑security services, as some European intelligence services have consistently worked on fomenting tensions and divisions between the two nations of Iran and Afghanistan.
For example, during the twelve‑day war, a video was widely circulated on social media claiming that more than 300 Afghan nationals were digging tunnels in order to infiltrate a highly sensitive military installation. This video spread in a strange and extensive manner across all digital platforms, even though the entire story behind it was false, and the footage actually belonged to a different time, place, and subject.
Such actions—which I describe as “designed operations”—are the direct or indirect product of British intelligence services, because creating and expanding discord between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan, and between the peoples of the two countries, has long been and continues to be one of the permanent strategies of British intelligence and security services.
Thus, during the twelve‑day war, a process of rumor‑mongering, accusation‑making, and hatred‑production against Afghan migrants took shape in Iran’s cyberspace. Due to the war‑induced tensions and the massive volume of news and information published during that period, it was not possible to effectively monitor and contain this erroneous trend through media management and public awareness‑raising.
It should be noted that there were also actions taken by the migrant community itself to contain these slanders and hate‑spreading campaigns. Among them were the commemoration of the martyrdom of some Afghan nationals who, during the aforementioned war, were martyred by the Zionist regime on Iranian soil alongside Iranian citizens, as well as efforts to inform the public about the solidarity and empathy of migrants with the Iranian people—such as Afghan women holding prayer gatherings for the defeat of the Zionist regime and the victory of the fighters of Islam.
These actions were efforts to display the solidarity and harmony of the two nations of Iran and Afghanistan on the issue of opposition to the Zionist regime. However, the speed and scale at which these expressions of solidarity were disseminated were not comparable to the speed of dissemination of divisive falsehoods.
Nevertheless, after the end of the war, the relevant officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran corrected this atmosphere, denied the false information, and it was proven that only a very small and limited percentage of migrants and Afghan nationals were involved in cases related to cooperation with the Zionist regime.
In reality, the various and numerous challenges faced by officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran during the twelve‑day war had prevented effective management of the media environment and the clarification of public opinion regarding the role of migrants in the events of those days.
On the other hand, European security services—specifically British services—made maximum use of that atmosphere and designed and disseminated false news against Afghan migrants. Although after the war these false reports were denied by Iranian officials, the power and speed of denials are not comparable to the power and speed of the spread of false rumors. In other words, those rumors and falsehoods poison public opinion, while denials—no matter how swiftly issued—still fail to cover the full scope of the rumors and false news that had been circulated.
Practically speaking, in order to prevent such divisive news and activities by the enemies of the two nations, those enabling conditions must be controlled, and such conditions must not be allowed to form or expand in the first place.
The difference regarding the issue of Afghan migrants during the riots of the month of Dey (January 2026), compared with the atmosphere of the twelve‑day war, was that the careless and lawless state of Iran’s cyberspace was restricted during the recent riots. In other words, the platform that could have fueled rumors was not available; therefore, we did not witness the spread of false news on various issues, including Afghan migrants.
Prior to the outbreak of the twelve‑day war, there was an intense wave of discourse surrounding the expulsion of migrants and related debates within Iranian society. After the Zionist regime’s attack, that atmosphere and the erroneous agitation that had been created showed its effects in the domain of Afghan migrants.
However, during the riots of Dey, that climate and atmosphere which had existed against Afghan migrants prior to the twelve‑day war had subsided. For this reason, the space and the enabling conditions were not sufficiently favorable for the formation of hate‑mongering and the spread of rumors regarding migrants.
Nevertheless, during this period—despite the fact that cyberspace and the internet were under control—I personally observed one or two cases in which attempts were made to spread false news about the role of Afghan migrants in the recent riots. For example, the dissemination of a claim that Afghan nationals were present among the rioters. However, this rumor failed to spread or gain traction. One reason was the restriction of cyberspace, and another was that the negative background against migrants, such as that which existed at the beginning of 1404, was no longer present.
The reason for the peaceful behavior and the lack of alignment by the Afghan migrant community in such seditions and riots is that the overwhelming majority of migrants residing in Iran share several characteristics:
First, they are religious and dedicated individuals who understand that Iranian society is their “second home,” and that their interests and security are tied to Iran’s security.
Most Afghan migrants—both those who have lived in Iran for many years and those who have resided there for a shorter period—have an emotional attachment and bond with this land. As mentioned earlier, they regard it as their second home. They have come here in order to have security, livelihood, and a better and more stable life, and they understand that any problem or insecurity for Iran would deprive everyone—including migrants—of security, employment opportunities, and a decent life. It is precisely because of this common interests and benefits between the two countries and two nations that the majority of the Afghan migrant community residing in Iran kept themselves away from such anti‑security actions.
Over the past year, we have fortunately observed that the Afghan migrant community—demonstrating a mature and well‑considered outlook—has stood alongside the host society and expressed its empathy, solidarity, and cooperation in various ways.
Given the track record of the migrant community’s peaceful behavior in incidents such as the recent riots you referred to, what obstacles exist that prevent this community from being viewed as a “positive capacity” and a “partner” in resolving social issues and even in ensuring local and national security?
In my view, migrants have played their role well. That is, the Afghan migrant community in Iran has done the maximum that it could reasonably do in incidents such as the events of 1404 (January, 2026).
They have reached a level of maturity whereby they understand the need to distance themselves from riots and conflicts within the host society, as well as the realization that their security and tranquility are equal to Iran’s security and tranquility.
Moreover, the migrant community did not wish to become contaminated by destabilizing elements or events, and in my view, this is a significant progress. This very maturity and awareness constitute the best form of cooperation in preserving security and calm in Iran.
What is expected of guests residing in Iran is that they participate in safeguarding the security of this home. In my opinion, this expectation has been fulfilled. Afghan guests have played their role properly and did not allow themselves to be exploited to create insecurity in Iran.
On the other hand, we have also witnessed the participation of some Afghan migrants in the cultural and social movements of the Iranian people aimed at containing riots. For example, they took part in marches and gatherings held between the days of 19- 22 Day (9-12, January, 2026) to oppose the riots and condemn terrorists. Many Afghan migrants and nationals in Qom, Mashhad, and several other cities, through their participation in these gatherings, played their role in maintaining order and security in Iranian society.
In other words, in the same arena in which Iranian citizens found the opportunity and space to participate in safeguarding societal security, some Afghan citizens and migrants were also present and demonstrated their support for the security and tranquility of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The context for the recent riots in the country was economic and livelihood‑related issues. What impact do policies such as the removal of preferential exchange rates have on the lives of migrants? Can this economic pressure intensify the cycle of “poverty, marginalization, and vulnerability” within this community?
Since Afghan migrants are part of Iran’s economic cycle, their livelihoods find meaning within the framework of Iran’s economy. Naturally, the economic problems of Iranian society are transferred to them as well. They, too—just like Iranian citizens—experience hardship, vulnerability, and livelihood constraints. This situation manifests itself in marginalization, the expansion of informal settlements, the spread of poverty, and similar phenomena.
When an Afghan migrant lives in Iranian society, has employment, incurs expenses, earns income, and is considered part of the social fabric, it is evident that the same pressures borne by the majority of the Iranian population are also borne by them.
In practice, both groups are under pressure. It is not the case that this pressure is separated or differentiated between migrants and Iranian citizens.
For this reason, in this matter, everyone living in Iran is, in one way or another, sitting in the same boat. If damage occurs in the economic and livelihood sphere, everyone is affected.
Given the country’s economic situation and rising living costs, what behavior or reaction can be anticipated from the Afghan migrant community residing in Iran? Can a deterioration of Iran’s economic conditions lead to increased motivation to return?
Afghan migrants in Iran are engaged in various professions and economic activities. These livelihood and economic problems may, for some of them, limit the continuation of work and life in Iran to such an extent that they conclude it would be better to live in another country in order to secure better livelihoods and employment, and thus leave Iran.
Especially those migrants who came to Iran in search of better livelihoods and employment may prefer to leave if they feel that the economic situation no longer meets their economic interests. However, I do not believe this applies to a large percentage of the migrant community.
That is, the majority of migrants adapt to these conditions. Perhaps a small percentage—around four or five percent—may decide, if these conditions persist, to return to Afghanistan or to continue their lives and work in other countries such as those on the margins of the Persian Gulf. But for most Afghan nationals and migrants in Iran, even if economic conditions are unfavorable, their preference remains to live in Iran, because life in Iran is far better for them than living in Arab countries or in Europe.
They are in their second home in Iran and in proximity to their own country. Iran offers a more suitable living environment for them than countries such as the UAE or European states.
Some analysts suggest that the general rise in prices may be part of a policy aimed at reducing migrants’ incentive to remain in Iran. Do you agree with this analysis? How would you assess such a policy in terms of effectiveness and its human and security consequences?
In any case, the Afghan migrant community in Iran is an economically active community, and because it participates in economic activity, it will inevitably be affected within this cycle. However, the damage is not so severe as to remove it from the economic cycle altogether.
For example, in various sectors such as housing construction, industry, and services, just as prices rise, wages and incomes also rise. This means that if living costs increase, wages and earnings also increase to some extent.
Therefore, the impact is not so severe as to amount to the elimination of migrants from the country’s economic cycle. As noted earlier, for this reason the number of those who decide to leave Iran or return to Afghanistan remains below four or five percent, which is not a significant proportion.
What social and cultural impacts does the country’s economic situation have on the lives of the Afghan migrant community in Iran, and what solutions do you propose to manage these challenges?
When a society experiences economic hardship and livelihood pressure, human relations suffer. Crime, inappropriate behavior, and social harms increase. There is a logical connection between rising economic problems and the growth of social and cultural problems and harms.
Accordingly, the Afghan migrant community is not immune from these challenges and will be affected in this sphere as well. As for solutions, under the current conditions and economic policies, there is no solution other than increasing patience and tolerance until these problems are resolved—both for the people of Iran and for Afghan migrants.
Most people living in Iran are subject to these social and cultural harms arising from economic difficulties and will suffer from them. My recommendation to everyone living in Iran—whether Iranian or Afghan—is to exercise patience in the face of hardships, so that, God willing, conditions will improve.
Of course, cooperation, mutual assistance, and empathy with others in such circumstances will make these difficulties more bearable and will reduce the undesirable consequences of economic problems.
