According to Iraf, in 2025, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of the Israeli regime, failed to free himself from his deep internal troubles, and the regime also failed to repair its damaged international image. Now the plan to recognize the State of Palestine has reached its highest point, with 157 out of 193 UN member states now recognizing it.
After the inauguration ceremony, Donald Trump, the US President, strongly supported the Prime Minister of the Zionist regime. Consequently, the United States imposed sanctions against the International Criminal Court and the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories. In a strange move, Trump and his Secretary of State blocked the entry of a Palestinian delegation—including the moderate leader Mahmoud Abbas—to the United States to attend the UN General Assembly in New York in September. The US administration continued its efforts to delegitimize UNRWA and maintained unlimited military, financial, and political support for the occupying regime. During a trip to the occupied territories, Trump addressed the Knesset and, by insisting that the President of the Zionist regime pardon his close friend Netanyahu—who faces four corruption and abuse‑of‑power trials—made an unprecedented intervention in the regime’s internal affairs. Trump even briefly embraced the Israeli regime’s dreams of ethnic change in Gaza, expressing support for turning it into a “Gaza Riviera” devoid of population and openly endorsing the expulsion of Gaza residents to third countries.
Rising Anxiety Among Israelis
These positive signals from Washington appear, according to a Gallup poll, to have increased Israelis’ sense of well‑being. However, it must be said that although daily stress and sadness among Israelis have decreased since the start of the war on Gaza, the Palestinian‑occupation conflict still dominates public consciousness. When Gallup asked Israelis in an open‑ended question to identify the most important problem facing them, 71% pointed to issues related to law and order—war, conflict, and violence. Fewer than one in ten mentioned economic problems (9%) or government performance (6%).
Anxiety among Israelis is partly due to the dramatic collapse of the regime’s global image. Israelis traveling abroad experience the shift in world public opinion firsthand. The popular Eurovision Song Contest—in which the Israeli regime has long participated despite not being European—faces boycotts by several leading countries including Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands, and Slovenia. While efforts to expel the occupying regime from international sports competitions have so far been unsuccessful, its sports teams have faced widespread anger and protests during international matches. Fans of the occupying regime were barred from attending one of their team’s matches in Britain, and crowds at other games have loudly expressed solidarity with Palestinians and their anger toward the Israeli regime.
For Netanyahu, the initial closeness with Trump was short‑lived. The US President continued his efforts to free Zionist hostages, but the 20‑point plan, first presented to Arab and Muslim leaders in New York in September, overturned Netanyahu’s earlier ideas of an empty Gaza and fantasies of ethnic cleansing.
Nevertheless, Trump’s plan—unveiled in a high‑profile ceremony in Sharm el‑Sheikh without Netanyahu or any Zionist official present—has stalled at its very first stage. While hostages were released, the promised ceasefire never materialized. Since the plan’s launch on October 10, more than 350 Palestinians have been killed. Food aid continues to reach Gaza at a rate far below the promised 600 trucks per day. To date, neither the proposed Palestinian technocratic committee nor an international stabilization force to administer Gaza or enforce the ceasefire has been deployed. The Rafah crossing is also effectively closed.
Will Netanyahu Escape Conviction?
Despite Trump’s personal support, it remains unclear whether Netanyahu will be exempted from conviction, imprisonment, or political disqualification. Citing Trump’s public request for a pardon, Netanyahu submitted an unusual pardon request that lacked required legal elements: admission of guilt, expression of remorse, or a commitment to withdraw from political life. Although the President of the Zionist regime has broad, largely unlimited pardon powers, it is unlikely that a full pardon would be granted to Netanyahu without imposing some restrictions. Elections are predicted for 2026, and polls show no realistic scenario in which Netanyahu could form another majority coalition.
Some regional achievements claimed by Netanyahu’s government are also temporary. The Israeli occupation regime’s routine military operations in Syria and Lebanon have drawn sharp criticism even from the Trump administration, which hosted Syrian leader Ahmad al‑Shar’ at the White House. The Zionist regime has also faced public rebuke from the new Pope Leo XIV, who visited Lebanon and spoke openly about the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza.
Israel’s air superiority, of which it boasted, faces new challenges as the Trump administration has agreed to sell advanced F‑35 jets to Saudi Arabia. Egypt has also reasserted its regional influence. Since the Sharm el‑Sheikh event, Cairo has emerged alongside Turkey as a key player in efforts to resolve the Gaza crisis.
Even the once‑unshakable base of support from American Christian fundamentalists appears to be weakening. Netanyahu’s government has spent millions trying to rebuild its image among Christian Zionists, an area many believed the occupying regime could never lose. Yet cracks are emerging, including within the Republican Party. Even members of Congress and new candidates for public office have begun openly rejecting funding for the American‑Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the Israeli regime.
On the surface, 2025 was a significant year for the Zionist regime and Netanyahu. But the honeymoon seems to be ending. 2026 is approaching, with several political and diplomatic landmines that even Netanyahu—long praised for his political survival skills—may not be able to avoid. It must be said that the fate of the Israeli Prime Minister now lies in the hands of the President of that star—and soon in the hands of voters in the upcoming Knesset elections.
Netanyahu’s Trip to America
Netanyahu’s visit to Trump’s Mar‑a‑Lago resort in South Florida—which will be his fifth in‑person meeting with Trump in the United States—is scheduled for December 29. As this meeting approaches, the rift between the two leaders appears to be widening rather than narrowing. Reported tensions between the two leaders reflect their pursuit of very different regional strategies. Trump’s team seeks to complete and institutionalize negotiated agreements for regional conflicts, especially the two‑year Gaza war. In contrast, the Israeli regime has adopted a military‑centric strategy aimed at preventing the strengthening of any potential threat.
The divergence between US and Israeli approaches was revealed again last week when reports emerged that Netanyahu intends to use the upcoming meeting partly to persuade Trump of the need for further Israeli attacks on Iran’s ballistic‑missile sites. In reality, Zionist officials are increasingly concerned about the expansion of Iran’s ballistic‑missile program. They also believe Iran is rebuilding nuclear‑enrichment sites that the United States attacked in June. However, the Israeli regime currently views the rebuilding of Iran’s ballistic‑missile arsenal as a more immediate concern. By acknowledging the possibility of any preemptive action by Israel sparking a regional conflagration, Iranian leaders last week reacted to reports of renewed attack considerations by reiterating their intent to retaliate against any Israeli attack with a massive missile barrage that, Iran claims, could paralyze the regime’s military capability and economy. It must be said that Iran’s ability to inflict damage inside the occupying regime is significant. Regarding the extent of damage inflicted on it by Iranian retaliatory strikes during the 12‑day war, “Nir Kfir,” a Zionist analyst on the Hebrew website Walla, stated that we must distinguish between the costs of the Gaza war and the costs of a war with Iran; because discussing the costs of the Gaza war was easy, but regarding Iran it is very difficult, as the costs of military strikes as well as air‑defense operations were enormous, including huge expenses for fighter‑jet fuel and significant use of expensive interceptor missiles.
“Yehuda Sharoni,” an economic expert of the Zionist regime, also says: A war with a country like Iran, which is about 2,000 kilometers away, has imposed terrible costs on Israel’s economy, and alongside the costs of the Gaza war, the 2025 military budget, which on paper is stated as 110 billion shekels, is ridiculous; because these costs could reach 200 billion shekels.
The near future could offer significant opportunities for Iran. These opportunities can be defined as reviewing military tactics, rebuilding industrial infrastructure related to missile capability, making existing systems more agile, and introducing a new generation of weapons into the operational cycle. Netanyahu will present Trump with the option that the United States join or assist any new Israeli attack on Iran. However, Trump continues to claim he is seeking a negotiated nuclear deal with Iran and is unlikely to join any new Zionist‑regime attack.
While Trump and his team seek to prevent another war between Iran and Israel, they are more concerned about the occupying regime’s strategy regarding several regional fronts where its military action could undermine US diplomacy or engagement. Especially in Gaza, US officials insist that the Israeli‑Hamas ceasefire, which came into effect in October under Trump’s 20‑point plan, be maintained. In recent foreign‑policy remarks, Trump has claimed he resolved the Gaza war and “brought peace to the Middle East.” A resumption of the Gaza conflict would directly undermine Trump’s message and also dash any hope of securing partners for a Gaza peacekeeping force or funding the reconstruction of the besieged enclave.
Trump and Netanyahu’s teams also have similar disagreements over Syria policy. Trump and his team view the post‑Assad government led by Ahmad al‑Shar’ as a partner for the United States that can take on the burden of the anti‑ISIS mission in Syria. Instead of building relations with Damascus, the Israeli regime uses hard power to show it will not allow any threat—whether from Syrian forces or foreign Islamist fighters allied with Damascus—to gather.
At Mar‑a‑Lago, Trump will likely advise Netanyahu not to launch a major battle against Hezbollah in Lebanon. But the Zionist regime’s position clearly indicates that after October 7, the regime sees control over territory and key buffer zones as the only guarantee of its protection, rejecting Trump’s arguments that a broader Middle East peace is what will secure Israel in the long term.
