The arrest of Sultan Aziz Azzam, the spokesperson for ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), in Pakistan, while potentially a serious blow to this terrorist group’s propaganda machine, simultaneously raises new questions about Pakistan’s role in regional security dynamics, the future of ISIS-K’s media activities, and the implications of this action for Afghanistan and its neighbors.
By: Samira Mohammadi Published: December 21, 2025 (approximately, based on the Persian calendar date)
According to IRAF, Pakistan has recently announced the arrest of Sultan Aziz Azzam, the spokesperson for ISIS’s Khorasan branch. Pakistan’s state television confirmed the news, citing officials from the country. Previously, the United Nations Security Council’s Sanctions Committee had also reported the arrest of this senior ISIS member.
Despite this, the release of this news has sparked numerous questions, including about Azzam’s true identity, his background, the relationship between ISIS and Pakistan, and the goals and security consequences of this action for Afghanistan and the region. These questions are especially significant given prior conflicting reports about whether he was killed or alive.
Who is Sultan Aziz Azzam?
Sultan Aziz Azzam is from the “Bati Kot” district in Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan, but he spent his formative years in the “Zakhil” refugee camp in Peshawar, Pakistan. During Hamid Karzai’s presidency, he briefly worked in the electoral office of Nangarhar province.
Azzam was also regarded as a cultural figure; he was a poet who has published more than 10 poetry books in Pashto and had experience as a radio announcer. In one of his works titled “Rahguzar” (The Passerby), he described his journey to joining ISIS’s security and military structures.
According to some accounts, after ISIS-Khorasan announced its presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Azzam gravitated toward Wahhabism and joined the group. In 2015, leveraging his media experience, he launched the “Voice of the Caliphate” radio station in Nangarhar and gradually assumed simultaneous responsibilities as spokesperson and head of propaganda for ISIS-K.
In 2018, the commander of foreign forces in Afghanistan claimed that Sultan Aziz Azzam had been killed in a drone strike in the “Pachir Agam” area of Nangarhar province. The spokesperson for Afghanistan’s Interior Ministry confirmed the news at the time. However, in 2021, the U.S. State Department placed “Sanaullah Ghafari” (ISIS-K leader), Mawlawi Rajab (known as “Rajab Salahuddin”), and Sultan Aziz Azzam on its list of international terrorists and imposed sanctions. Afterward, Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban’s senior spokesperson, again declared that Azzam had been killed in Nangarhar three years earlier. This narrative did not last, as two years later, “Al-Marsad” media (affiliated with Taliban intelligence) reported that Azzam was alive and identified him as responsible for ISIS propaganda. Now, the news of his arrest in Pakistan has once again highlighted these contradictions.
Azzam’s Arrest: Silencing ISIS’s Voice in Pakistan?
The arrest of the individual recognized as the mastermind of ISIS-K’s propaganda apparatus raises the question of how the group’s media activities and recruitment efforts will proceed without him.
After the Taliban’s return to power and the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the ISIS-K threat became a major security concern at both regional and global levels. This threat extended beyond Afghanistan to countries like Iran, Russia, some European nations, and even the United States.
According to a report by the UN Security Council’s Sanctions Monitoring Team published on February 6, 2025, ISIS-K was assessed as the “largest transregional terrorist threat.” Additionally, Vladimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General for the UN Counter-Terrorism Office, emphasized that the group remains a significant threat in Afghanistan—a position largely shaped by its propaganda machine, in which Azzam played a central and directing role.
In other words, analysts attribute one of the main reasons for ISIS-K’s growth to its advanced, multilingual propaganda network. By focusing on linguistic diversity, especially in Central and South Asia, it has successfully recruited new members through the “Khorasan Project” strategy. This project demonstrates ISIS’s reliance on targeted propaganda to infiltrate and establish presence in new territories.
In this context, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s College London recently examined ISIS-K’s extensive activities on virtual platforms. The report notes that after Telegram removed ISIS channels and supporters in 2019, the group migrated to platforms like “Hoop,” “Rocket.Chat,” and “TamTam.”
It identified 82 pro-ISIS channels on Hoop, with 30 specifically targeting South Asian audiences and often operating in English. ISIS has also used the open-source Rocket.Chat platform—which has millions of global users—to host its channels and servers, particularly attracting larger audiences for Arabic-language content.
In these circumstances, Azzam’s arrest has likely dealt a severe blow to the “heart of ISIS-K’s propaganda war.” The group’s expansion in recent years owes more to this powerful, professional, and multilingual propaganda apparatus—headed by him—than anything else.
ISIS-Khorasan and Pakistan’s Relationship: Hidden Cooperation or Security Pragmatism?
This event has another implication: Azzam’s arrest on Pakistani soil has refocused attention on Pakistan’s role in matters related to ISIS-K. It revives longstanding unresolved questions about the degree of infiltration, tolerance, or opposition by Pakistani security institutions toward ISIS activities in the region.
Islamabad has consistently portrayed itself as a “victim of terrorism” while denying any links to ISIS-K—especially accusations from the Taliban over the past four years. Yet, on-the-ground realities indicate that senior members and leaders of the group live in Pakistan’s border areas or emerged from Afghan refugee camps along the border. This presence has not only been a threat to Islamabad but also an opportunity.
Pakistan, needing international support amid disputes (particularly with India and the Taliban), views ISIS-K as a threat that allows it to project itself as a reliable partner in managing terrorism and counterterrorism cooperation.
Observers believe Pakistan, drawing from past experiences with regional militant groups, sees ISIS-K not as an absolute enemy but as a controllable threat—one that can be restrained or activated as leverage in regional dynamics, especially against the Taliban in Afghanistan. By monopolizing the narrative of fighting ISIS (something the Taliban has failed to convincingly achieve despite claims), Pakistan influences future security equations between Kabul and Islamabad.
Additionally, critics of Pakistan—including the Taliban, their influential lobbyist Zalmay Khalilzad, and circles tied to the former Afghan Republic government—speculate that Pakistan is nurturing ISIS-K on behalf of the U.S., preventing its total elimination to advance future American projects in Afghanistan and the region. Occasional arrests of senior figures are seen as efforts to deny and conceal this role.
Whatever the truth, the presence of ISIS-K leaders and spokespersons in Pakistan, along with the group’s deep infiltration in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas, remains a puzzling ambiguity that may never be fully resolved.
